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Abstract
In this study1 we show that by the current state-of-the-art syn-
thetically generated fingerprints can easily be discriminated from real
fingerprints. We propose a non-parametric distribution based method
using second order extended minutiae histograms (MHs) which can
distinguish between real and synthetic prints with very high accuracy.
MHs provide a fixed-length feature vector for a fingerprint which are
invariant under rotation and translation. This ’test of realness’ can
be applied to synthetic fingerprints produced by any method. In this
work, tests are conducted on the 12 publicly available databases of
FVC2000, FVC2002 and FVC2004 which are well established bench-
marks for evaluating the performance of fingerprint recognition algo-
rithms; 3 of these 12 databases consist of artificial fingerprints gener-
ated by the SFinGe software. Additionally, we evaluate the discrimina-
tive performance on a database of synthetic fingerprints generated by
the software of Bicz versus real fingerprint images. We conclude with
suggestions for the improvement of synthetic fingerprint generation.
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Figure 1: Four fingerprint images reproduced from page 292 in [2]: three
of these fingerprint images were acquired from real fingers using different
sensors and one is a synthetically generated fingerprint. Can you identify
the artificial fingerprint? The solution is given below.
At the Fifteenth International Conference on Pattern Recognition held in
September 2000, ’about 90 participants, most of them with some background
in fingerprint analysis’ (quoted from page 293 in [2]) were shown four fin-
gerpint images (reproduced in Figure 1). They were told that three images
were acquired from real fingers and one of these prints was synthetically gen-
erated and they were asked to identify the artificial print. Only 23% of the
participants correctly chose the synthetic print (image (a) in Figure 1).
In this paper, we present a method that is able to perform the task at
which the human experts failed: we introduce a test of realness which can
separate real from synthetic fingerprint images with very high accuracy. We
applied the method (a detailed description follows in Section 2 and 3) to
these four images and the proposed method distinctly identifies the correct
image (computing the difference of minutiae histogram distances explained
in Section 2.1 yields a negative score for image (a) in Figure 1 and positive
scores for images (b-d)).
1 Introduction
Today, many commercial, governmental and forensic applications rely on
fingerprint recognition for verifying or establishing the identity of a person.
Among these, methods building on minutiae matching play an eminent role.
Usually, matching routines are not only tested on real fingers, but in order
to provide for theoretically unlimited sample sizes, synthetic fingerprint gen-
eration systems such as SFinGe by Cappelli et al. ([3]) have been developed
in the past. Independently, methods have been developed to reconstruct
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fingerprints from minutiae templates (cf. [4]). Both methodologies are very
relevant in many application areas:
• Constructing synthetic fingerprint images facilitates the cheap creation
of very large databases for testing and comparing the performance of
algorithms in verification and identification scenarios.
• Ground truth data is provided for evaluating the performance of foren-
sic experts [5] as well as minutiae extraction algorithms.
• Matching performance of low-quality and latent fingerprints is im-
proved [6].
• Fingerprint reconstruction can be a building block for solving inter-
operability problems, e.g. on comparing fingerprints acquired from
different sensors [2].
• Research in this area raises the awareness for aspects of security, pri-
vacy and data protection bearing in mind that an attacker may utilize
existing techniques for creating a spoof and prepare a presentation
attack.
• Mixing prints of two or more real fingers has been proposed for gen-
erating virtual identities, obscuring private information or creating
cancelable templates [7].
Of course, synthetic prints should be as real as possible pertaining to all
properties and features which are relevant for fingerprint recognition, espe-
cially with respect to their minutiae distribution. Otherwise, a human may
be fooled by the look of a synthetic print (see the motivational example
given before the introduction taken from page 293 in [2]), but their eligibil-
ity e.g. for evaluating fingerprint recognition algorithms may be challenged
and results obtained on artificial databases would be insignificant.
A unifying concept of the ’correct’ minutiae distribution. Finger-
print synthesis and fingerprint reconstruction have been treated for a long
time as different tasks. This can be well conceived on the background that
the issue of realistic minutiae distributions has only played a subordinate
role in theoretical model building and practical research. In our contribu-
tion we provide for a simple method to assess minutiae distributions of single
fingerprints as well as of samples of fingerprints. We demonstrate that after
training, this allows to decide that minutiae patterns of synthetically gener-
ated fingerprints are not ’correct’. In particular, we believe that including
realistic minutiae distributions leads to a unified concept in which synthetic
fingerprint generation and fingerprint reconstruction are in fact two sides of
the same coin. We will return to this point in Section 4.
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Fingerprints of fingerprints. Minutiae histograms (MHs) introduced
below assign any given fingerprint image a fixed length feature vector. This
feature vector is not only highly potent to discriminate real fingerprints from
fingerprints synthetically generated by the only publicly available current
state of the art system, in a preliminary study we additionally demonstrate
that this new feature vector is also highly discriminatory among real fin-
gerprints as well. Given reliably extracted minutiae and sufficent overlap of
latent fingerprint images, MHs allow for fast and effective matching. More
precisely, it seems that already the second order MHs reflecting minutiae
pairs only, promise a high potential awaiting to be yet unleashed. Note that
higher order MHs can be assessed via minutiae triplets, quadruplets etc.
While local minutiae statistics are widely used for matching, our contri-
bution is to consider global minutiae statistics and measure distances by a
metric that effectively captures human perception: the earth mover’s dis-
tance.
1.1 Construction and Reconstruction of Fingerprints
As made clear above, in our contribution we focus on the role of minutiae
distributions. This issue is currently gaining momentum in the scientific
community, cf. [6, 8, 9]. In contrast to [9], who use parametric mixture
models, we take a nonparametric statistical approach.
We begin our exposition with biological principles currently believed to
govern minutiae formation and their distribution. To date, however, these
principles are still not satisfactorily understood [10, 11, 8]. Subsequently, we
put the SFinGe method into context with these biological hypotheses and
describe an alternate method based on real fingerprint images for generating
latent fingerprints, contrasting in this and other aspects. Thereafter, we
allude to the similarities between fingerprint generation and reconstruction
which will resurface when we propose improvements in synthetic fingerprint
generation. We conclude this section by laying out the plan of the paper.
Fingerprint formation guided by Merkel cells. Ku¨cken and Cham-
pod propose a model for fingerprint formation [8] that has two major in-
fluence factors: growth forces which create mechanical compressive stress
[10, 12] on the one hand, and Merkel cells rearranging from a random ini-
tial configuration into lines minimizing the compressive stress and inducing
primary ridges on the other hand. Merkel cells interact with each other
in reaction-diffusion systems of short range attraction and long range repul-
sion [13]. Based on empirical evidence from embryonic volar tissue evolution
(e.g. [14]), Ku¨cken and Champod let solutions of suitable partial differential
equations propagate from three centers: one along the flexion crease, one
at the volar pad (the core area) and one from the nail furrow. Based on
specific parameter choices, this process eventually forms a ridge line pattern
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featuring minutiae. Ku¨cken and Champod analyzed the images resulting
from simulation runs of their growth model and discovered qualitative dif-
ferences in comparison to real fingerprints. They conclude that with respect
to the natural variability of arrangements of minutiae ’only an empirical
acquisition of genuine fingerprints will provide an adequate source of data’
[8].
SFinGe. In a nutshell, growing fingerprint patches containing no minutiae
are generated starting from a number of randomly located points by the
iterative application of Gabor filters according to a previously generated
global orientation field [15] and a non-constant ridge frequency pattern.
Whenever patches meet, minutiae are produced whenever necessary for the
consistency of the global ridge pattern. A detailed description of the SFinGe
method by Cappelli et al. can be found in [3], Chapter 6 in [2] and Chapter
18 in [16].
In fact, the SFinGe model silently assumes biological hypotheses of fin-
gerprint pattern formation that are slightly different from the ones described
above. First, fingerprint patterns no longer propagate from a well defined
system of three original sources but rather from a multitude of sources at
random locations. Secondly, a main governing principle for minutiae cre-
ation lies in the compatibility of ridge patterns whenever growing patches
touch. These hypotheses in itself are very interesting and can be viewed as
intuitively natural; and their validity can be assessed with our methodology.
Our test of realness (Section 3.1) yields, however, that these hypotheses
explain the process of minutiae formation not satisfactorily (Section 3.2).
Notably, this shortfall of SFinGe cannot be explained by imprint dis-
tortions (which are already included in the SFinGe model) and the lack of
a true 3D model, as both would account mostly for neighboring bin per-
turbations or none at all. Using the earth mover’s distance [17], precisely
distinguishes between these minor perturbations and the major deviations
we found (for a detailed discussion cf. [18]).
Further methods. Further methods for generating synthetic fingerprint
images were proposed in 2002 by Araque et al. [19] and in 2003 by Bicz [20].
The methods of Araque et al. and SFinGe are similar in spirit and they both
rely on the global orientation field model of Vizcaya and Gerhardt [15] for
creating an orientation field. Examples of synthetic fingerprints generated
by this method are shown in Figure 2 (a) and (b).
Viewing fingerprints as holograms (cf. [21]), a given global orientation
field yields the continuous phase onto which so called spiral phases can be
added giving minutiae at specific predefined locations while other minutiae
occur due to continuity constraints. This allows for synthetic fingerprint
generation and four example images generated by the software of Bicz [20]
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are displayed in Figure 2 (c) to (f). Results reported in Section 3.2 show that
the method proposed in this paper can also discriminate between synthetic
fingerprints according to Bicz and real fingerprint images.
Creating forensic fingermarks from real prints. The approach by
Rodriguez et al. [5], since the minutiae are based on real fingers, does
not suffer from unrealistic minutiae configurations. It is however subject to
increased time, money and data protection constraints. Forensic fingermarks
(latent fingerprint images) are simulated in a semi-automatic way: fingers
of volunteers are recorded using a livescan device. During a period of about
30 seconds, each person performs a series of predefined movements which
results in fingerprint images with various distortions. Images are captured
at a rate of four frames per second. Minutiae are automatically extracted
followed by manual inspection and correction of falsely extracted or missed
minutiae. Starting with this ground truth data set, latents are simulated
using a region containing a cluster of 5-12 minutiae from the real fingerprint
images.
One use case for these simulated latents is to test the minutiae marking
performance of human experts which can be evaluated against the avaivable
ground truth information. Another application area is benchmarking the
identification performance of AFIS software.
Reconstruction. Various researches have shown that fingerprints can be
reconstructed from minutiae templates [22, 4, 6, 23]. There are two major
approaches for the automatic reconstruction of fingerprint images: first, the
iterative application of Gabor Filters as in SFinGe, and second, the usage
of amplitude- and frequency-modulated (AM-FM) functions [24, 25, 21]. In
both cases, the first step is the estimation of an orientation field which fits
the minutiae pattern. Fingerprint reconstruction from minutiae templates
and the generation of synthetic images follow similar principles. However,
the goal in the reconstruction scenario is to produce the same number of
minutiae at the same locations and with same direction and type as in the
template.
Synthetics vs. spoofs. The MH based method proposed in this paper
does not perform liveness detection [26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. In fact, we would
like to stress that if an attacker can produce a high quality spoof containing
the same minutiae as the imitated alive finger and puts this spoof finger on
fingerprint sensor, the proposed method will classify the acquired fingerprint
image as originating from a real finger with respect to the minutiae distri-
bution. Only attacks with spoofs based on synthetic images and synthetic
minutiae distributions are addressed in this work.
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Figure 2: (a) and (b) show examples of synthetic fingerprints generated by
the method of Araque et al. [19]; (c) to (f) display synthetic fingerprint
images created by the software of Bicz [20].
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1.2 Plan of the Paper
In the next section, we introduce second order extended minutiae histograms
(MHs) which for this paper we just call minutiae histograms: statistics of
pairs of two minutiae are used in combination with minutiae type infor-
mation and interridge distances to obtain a fingerprint of fingerprints. In
Section 3, extended MHs are applied for classifying a fingerprint into one
of the two categories, real or synthetic. Tests on the 12 publicly available
databases of FVC2000, FVC2002 and FVC2004 show the discriminative
power of this approach. In Section 4, detailed suggestions for the generation
of more realistic synthetic fingerprints are given. In Section 5, the suitabil-
ity of minutiae histograms for identification purposes is investigated and in
Section 6, MHs are proposed for the quantification of fingerprint evidence.
Section 7 conludes with a discussion and states topics of further research.
2 Extended Minutiae Histograms
Minutiae histograms (MHs) feature relations between minutiae. Here we
consider only second order MHs which feature relations between minutiae
pairs. Higher order MHs feature relations between triples, quadruplets, etc.,
respectively. As detailed below, in the following we consider only distance
and directional relations giving 2D-MHs. Including the entire spatial re-
lations and minutiae type would give 4D-MHs which are briefly discussed
further down. Moreover, MHs can be extended by adding other relevant
features giving extended minutiae histograms comprising
(i) 2D-MHs or 4D-MHs featuring a histograms of minutiae pairs,
(ii) interridge distances and
(iii) the percentage of bifurcations and endings in templates
cf. Table 1.
d distance in pixels between two minutiae.
α directional difference between two minutiae directions.
mIRD global mean interridge distance of a fingerprint.
vIRD global variance of interridge distances.
pbif percentage of bifurcations in a template.
Table 1: Extended 2D-MH feature overview.
2.1 2D-Minutiae Histograms
Here, we consider 2D-minutiae histograms, because they carry sufficient
power to discriminate between real and synthetic prints. We construct a
8
(a) (b)
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Figure 3: For a detailed description of the underlying sets I and III cf.
Section 3.2. (a) shows a minutiae template extracted from a real finger of
FVC2000 DB1 Set III and (b) from a synthetic print of FVC2000 DB4. (c)
visualizes the derived 2D-MH for the template in (a), and correspondingly
(e) displays the histogram of (b). The average histogram of FVC2000 DB1
Set I is visualized in (d) and for the synthetic fingers of FVC2000 DB4 in
(f). The EMD (see Section 2.1) from (c) to (d) is 0.66 and (c) to (f) 1.79.
Therefore, the template is correctly classified as belonging to a real finger.
The EMD from (e) to (d) is 1.69 und from (e) to (f) is 0.61, and consequently,
(e) is correctly recognized as stemming from an artificial finger. In (c-f),
distance bins are displayed from top to bottom, directional difference bins
from left to right. A high brightness value corresponds to a high number of
occurrences in a bin.
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real synthetic
nearby angles
nearly opposite angles
Figure 4: Details of mean MHs displayed for specific angles and mutual
minutiae distances between 0 and 80 pixels (each bin is 8 pixels wide) over
the databases of FVC2000, FVC2002 and FVC2004. Left column: means
of real fingers (DB1, DB2 and DB3 combined). Right colunn: mean over
synthetic fingerprints simulated with SFinGe (DB4). Top row: counts of
minutiae of mutual absolute angle distance ∈ [0, 18o]. Bottom row: counts
of minutiae of mutual absolute angle distance ∈ [172o, 180o]. The height of
the bar corresponds to the mean percentage of minutiae pairs sorted into that
bin.
two-dimensional frequency histogram by computing the distance d between
minutiae locations in pixels and directional difference α in degrees of the
two minutiae directions for all combinations of two minutiae in a template.
Both features are binned using identically sized, equidistant intervals.
Figure 3 (c) to (f) shows four histograms with 10 × 10 bins. Here,
distances di ≤ dmax = 200 pixels are divided into intervals of 20 pixels
ranges (distances increase from top to bottom) and directional differences
αi into 10 bins of 180
◦ total range. Each directional difference bin consists
of two intervals of 18◦ range and differences > 180◦ are mirrored into the
corresponding bin, e.g., α1 = 10
◦ and α2 = 350◦ are portioned into the same
bin, α3 = 170
◦ and α4 = 190◦ are grouped into one bin and α5 = 90◦ and
α6 = 270
◦ are also indexed into the same bin. In Figure 3 (c) to (f), the bins
of first column on the left are centered at 0◦. A detail of the first and last
column is displayed in Figure 4. Highlighting the differring distributions,
we have chosen dmax = 80 pixels.
In order to obtain a sensor-independent and age-independent descriptor,
the minutiae templates are rescaled to prints at 500 DPI. The templates
of FVC2002 DB2 (569 DPI) and FVC2004 DB3 (512 DPI) are demagnified
accordingly and the rescaling is taken into account during the estimation
of the interridge distances listed in Table 4. The rescaling facilitates a fair
comparison with synthetic prints which are designed to produce fingerprint
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images of approximately 500 DPI.
The description of FVC2000 DB3 [31] states that one third of the 19
volunteers were under 18 years of age. These prints could be easily enlarged
to the predicted adult print size at 500 DPI using the scaling factor attained
in [32], if additional information were available (the age and whether the
fingerprints was acquired from a male or female person). Since children
and adolescents have smaller fingers, the average ridge frequency and the
distances between two minutiae are smaller and applying the same bin limits
as for adults to the unscaled templates of still growing persons results in
different statistics. As a consequence, the classification could be even better,
if this additional information was available.
dmax Maximal distance in pixels between two minutiae.
bdist # of bins for distances in pixels.
bdir # of bins covering differences between two minutiae dirctions.
r Costs for moving mass along neighboring directional bins.
s Costs for moving mass along neighboring distance bins.
e Exponentiation factor for costs.
Table 2: 2D-MH parameter overview.
The distance between two 2D-MHs is computed by the earth mover’s
distance (EMD) [17] which measures the distance between two distributions
by computing the minimal cost for transforming one distribution into the
other. This metric is especially useful for comparing histograms [33] and has
many applications, e.g. in content-based image retrieval [18]. The concept
was first described by G. Monge in 1781 and is also known as Mallows
distance, Wasserstein distance or Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance.
The cost matrix of the transport problem consists of the composite costs
for moving mass along the distance bins and for moving mass along the
directional difference bins. For example, moving mass m from distance bin
x und directional bin u to distance bin y and directional bin v results in the
following costs c:
c = m · ((s · |x− y|)e + (r · |u− v|)e)
The auction algorithm of Bertsekas [34] or the shortlist method [17] can
be applied to solve the transportation problem and to compute the EMD.
The favorable computational runtime of the shortlist method in compari-
son to other methods gains relevance especially for transportation problems
of larger dimensionality, or if a very large number of EMDs is to be com-
puted [17].
For the classification of fingerprints into real or synthetic, an average 2D-
MH is computed for each of the two classes (using a set of minutiae templates
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described in Section 3). The average 2D-MHs act as representatives for its
respective class. All 2D-MH are normalized such that the sum of the masses
in all bins amounts to 1.
For a minutiae template which shall be classified into real or synthetic,
first, the 2D-MH of the template is computed and it is normalized. Next,
the EMD between the 2D-MH of the unknown class and the average 2D-
MH of the real fingers is computed as well as and the EMD to the average
2D-MH of the synthetic prints. The minutiae template can be classified by
simply choosing the class with the smaller EMD (see upper half in Table 7)
or both EMDs can used in combination with additional features (see lower
half in Table 7). The score referred to in Figure 1 is simply the difference
of the EMDs. For identification, we use unnormalized intersection distances
of unnormalized MHs instead, cf. Section 5.
2.2 4D-MHs
Minutiae properties not considered so far in the 2D-MH are the angle of the
relative position of the second minutia with respect to the first and the local
combination of minutiae types. Minutiae types are currently accounted for
only as a global value (percentage of bifurcations in a template).
In order to classify a print as real or synthetic, this additional information
is not necessary, but for other applications, it can be useful and should be
considered. The 2D-MHs can easily be augmented by these additional two
dimensions giving 4D-MHs.
In Section 5, the usage of 4D-MHs in an identification scenario is studied
and in Section 6, we propose to apply the empirical distribution of extended
4D-MHs for quantifying the weight of fingerprint evindence in court.
2.3 Minutiae Type
DB 1 DB 2 DB 3 DB 4
FVC2000 38.8 43.6 40.2 30.0
FVC2002 38.1 37.8 36.3 29.2
FVC2004 46.5 37.3 55.8 32.1
Table 3: Average percentages of bifurcations in minutiae templates for real
(DB 1-3) and synthetic (DB 4) fingerprints.
Table 3 lists the average percentages of bifurcations in minutiae tem-
plates for each of the FVC databases. Some fluctations among the databases
containing real fingerprints can be observed which can be attributed to
various causes including image quality and its influence on the automatic
minutiae extraction, the usage of different sensors with different properties
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including the size of the captured finger surface, the variability and distri-
bution of minutiae in the fingers of the volunteers whose fingerprints were
acquired for building the databases. However, we notice that the artificial
fingerprints generated by SFinGe tend to have systematically lower percent-
ages of bifurcations which is presumably caused by the image fabrication
process. Therefore, this percentage is included as a feature for the proposed
classification of a fingerprint as real or synthetic.
2.4 Interridge Distances
The interidge distance image Ξ assigns each pixel a local estimate of the
distance between two neighboring ridges (or two valleys). For prints acquired
from adults at a resolution of 500 DPI, the value of Ξ(x, y) is in the range
from 3 to 25 pixels (forensic researchers have shown that women tend to have
on average slightly smaller interridge distances than men (see [36, 37])).
The interridge distances listed in Table 4 are estimated by curved regions
as described in [35]. The orientation field estimate for constructing the
curved regions is obtained by using a combination of the line sensor method
[38] and a gradients based method as described in [39].
We observe (see Table 4) that the synthetic fingerprints (DB4) are marked
by lower estimated mean interridge distances and a lower variance of the in-
terridge distances in comparison to images of real fingers (DB1-DB3). Fig-
ure 5 shows the distribution of the global mean interidge distances and the
global variance of interridge distances for all images of FVC2000, FVC2002
and FVC2004.
Mean interridge distance Variance
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
FVC2000 9.24 9.07 10.53 7.60 3.53 2.87 3.85 2.15
FVC2002 8.85 9.00 8.88 7.34 2.63 2.73 3.35 1.58
FVC2004 9.15 9.40 8.80 7.90 3.46 3.86 4.06 2.17
Table 4: Mean and variance of interridge distances for real (DB1 - DB3)
and synthetic (DB4) fingerprints.
3 Separating the Real from the Synthetic
3.1 The Test of Realness: Training and Test Protocol
Tests are conducted on the publicly avaivable fingerprint competitions of
FVC2000, FVC2002 and FVC2004 [31, 40, 41]. Each competition consists
of four databases (DB1-DB4): for the first three databases, fingerprints
13
Figure 5: Global mean and variance of individual interridge distances per
image for all images of FVC2000, FVC2002 and FVC2004 estimated by
curved regions [35]. Systematic differences between images acquired from
real fingers (green) and synthetic images (red) are clearly visible.
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were acquired from volunteers using different sensors. The fourth database
contains synthetic fingerprints created by the SFinGe software.
All databases with real and synthetic prints contain images from 110
fingers with 8 impressions per finger. We divided each set of 110 fingers into
three independent, non-overlapping sets (see Table 5).
Set I Finger 1 to 40 Computing an average template
Set II Finger 41 to 70 Parameter training
Set III Finger 71 to 110 Testing the classification performance
Table 5: Set overview for each competion and database.
On set I, the average template is computed which acts as a representative
for its class (real for DB 1-3 and synthetic for DB 4). A few combinations
of the parameters listed in Table 2 and weights for linear feature fusion are
trained on set II and the configuration which leads to the best classification
is chosen for the test on set III.
The features are fused into a combined score s which is computed as
s = w0 +w1 ·a+w2 · b+w3 · c+w4 ·d, where a is the histogram EMD differ-
ence, b the normalized global mean of interridge distances, c the normalized
global variance of interridge distances and d the normalized percentage of
bifurcations in a template. The weights wi are trained on set II.
FVC2000 FVC2002 FVC2004
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
A B C D E F G H I J K L
A 0 0.02 0.06 1.11 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.68 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.44
B 0 0.05 1.11 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.68 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.43
C 0 1.10 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.68 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.44
D 0 1.11 1.11 1.12 0.58 1.11 1.11 1.11 0.81
E 0 0.03 0.11 0.68 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.44
F 0 0.11 0.68 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.44
G 0 0.71 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.48
H 0 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.29
I 0 0.05 0.04 0.43
J 0 0.03 0.45
K 0 0.45
L 0
Table 6: EMDs between the average 2D-MHs per database for all combina-
tions of databases (cf. Figure 6).
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Two-dimensional visualization by multidimensional scaling (MDS)
of EMD distances of mean 2D-MHs as reported in Table 6. (a): Real and
synthetic fingerprints. The 2D-MHs originating from synthetic prints are
labelled as D, H, L. (b): Separate MDS visualization for the mean 2D-MHs
of the real fingerprints only.
3.2 Results
Feature: 2D-MH
DB 1 vs. DB 4 DB 2 vs. DB 4 DB 3 vs. DB 4 Average
Set II Set III Set II Set III Set II Set III Set II Set III
FVC2000 93.3 90.0 95.0 83.8 98.3 95.0 95.5 89.6
FVC2002 86.7 88.8 90.0 86.3 85.0 78.8 87.2 84.6
FVC2004 81.7 55.0 81.7 67.5 90.0 70.0 84.5 64.2
Feature: 2D-MH
Set II Set III
FVC2000 DB1 vs. synthetic images according to Bicz [20] 83.3 92.5
Features: 2D-MH, interridge distances and percentage of bifurcations
DB 1 vs. DB 4 DB 2 vs. DB 4 DB 3 vs. DB 4 Average
FVC2000 100.0 92.5 100.0 87.5 100.0 97.5 100.0 92.5
FVC2002 100.0 97.5 100.0 95.0 100.0 90.0 100.0 94.2
FVC2004 95.0 72.5 90.0 83.8 98.3 97.5 94.4 83.6
Table 7: Classification performance (correctly classified templates in per-
cent). Distances between minutia histograms are measured using EMD.
The results on all available FVC databases show that the proposed
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method by extended 2D-MHs is able to separate real from synthetic prints
with very high accuracy. On the training sets of all databases of FVC2000
and FVC2002, the classification performance of the combined feature set
was 100%, and for the corresponding test sets, the performance was in the
range from 87.5 to 97.5%. On the whole, the image quality in the databases
of FVC2004 is clearly lower compared to the quality of images in previous
competitions. Hence, it it is more challenging to avoid errors during the au-
tomatic extraction of minutiae from theses images. We used a commercial
off-the-shelf software for minutiae extraction.
The good discriminative power of 2D-MHs alone is not surprising upon
inspection of a 2D visualization by multidimensional scaling (e.g. [42, Chap-
ter 14]) of the mutual 2D-MH distances from Table 6 in Figure 6. In the
left display, MHs from real fingers cluster in the middle of the left side while
MHs from synthetic fingerprints come to lie in the upper right (for the year
2000) and closer to the center towards the bottom (for the years 2002 and
2004). In fact, we can see that the algorithms leading to minutiae formation
have obviously undergone changes between the years 2000 and 2004, how-
ever, only moving the MHs moderately closer to ’realness’. In FVC2002,
SFinGe version 2.51 was used and in FVC2004 SFinGe version 3.0.
Additionally, we tested the performance of 2D-MHs for discriminating
between artificial fingerprint images generated by the software of Bicz [20]
and real fingerprint images. To this end, we generated 110 synthetic finger-
prints which were grouped into three sets as listed in Table 5, and compared
them against the 110 images of FVC2000 database 1. On set II, a classifica-
tion performance of 83.3% was achieved and on set III, 92.5% of the images
were correctly classified.
4 Suggestions on How to Improve the Generation
of Synthetic Fingerprints
Recall from Section 1.1 that the SFinGe model silently extends the well-
standing biological hypothesis of fingerprint pattern formation due to three
converging ridge systems (for a brief discussion, c.f. [12]), to a multitude
a converging ridge systems starting at random locations; this process is
the governing principle for minutiae formation. Our work shows that this
remarkable hypothesis can be tested and the tests show that the minutiae
pattern formation appears to be of a more complex nature. It would be of
interest to test fingerprint images generated by [8], [9] and other reseachers
using extended minutiae histograms, once they become available.
One possibility to improve SFinGe is to modify the fingerprint generation
process in such a way that the resulting fingerprint images have the following
properties:
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• MHs of synthetic prints should follow the distribution of MHs esti-
mated from a database of real fingers.
• More subtly also considering minutiae types, the relation of endings to
bifurcations should resemble the relation and its distribution observed
in real fingers.
• Similarly, the distribution of interridge distances should be similar to
those of real fingers acquired at the same resolution.
Two Sides of the Same Coin An alternative option for the creation of
synthetic fingerprints that pass the proposed ’test of realness’ is to consider
synthetic fingerprint generation as a reconstruction task. Traditionally, the
construction of artificial fingerprints is associated with an unknown outcome
regarding the number, location, direction and type of minutiae, whereas re-
construction aims at the generation of a fingerprint image which has best
possible similarity in terms of minutiae properties to a given template. Basi-
cally, we propose to focus on the generation of a ’realistic’ minutiae template
and “all these other things above shall be added unto” by the existing re-
construction methods. Here is a possible outline of this approach:
• First, a feasible foreground and orientation field is constructed, e.g.
using a global model like [15, 43] which is able to incorporate the em-
pirical distribution of observed pattern types (Henry-Galton classes)
and singular points [44].
• Secondly, a realistic number of minutiae n is drawn from the empir-
ical data of minutiae in fingerprints with the previously determined
foreground size and pattern type.
• Thirdly, an inital minutiae template is obtained by choosing n points
e.g. randomly on the foreground as minutiae locations and for each
location, the minutiae direction is set to the local orientation θ or
θ + 180◦ by chance.
• Fourthly, the 2D-MH of the minutiae template is computed and it
is modified iteratively until it passes the ’test of realness’, i.e. the
EMD between the current template and the average 2D-MH of real
fingerprints is below an acceptable threshold. Modification operations
are the deletion and addition of minutiae and flipping of the minutiae
direction by 180◦. The implementation for the computation of the
EMD allows to analyze the flow of mass, so that the bins in the 2D-
MH can be indentified which contribute above the ordinary to the
total costs, and thus, the minutiae pairs that are ’the most unlikely’
in comparison to the empirical distribution.
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Figure 7: In 597 out of 770 searches on FVC2000 DB2, the right finger
ranked first. However, in a few cases a considerable part of the database
had to be accessed in order to retrieve the template belonging to the query
finger. In this example, the search with impression four (left) of finger 105
resulted in a small intersection with the minutia histogram of same finger
(impression one, right). Missing and spurious minutiae as well as a small
overlap between the aligned templates deteriorate the performance for the
displayed query.
• Fifthly, minutiae types (ending and bifurcation) are assigned, based
on the empirical distribution in real finger patterns.
• Finally, the fingerprint image is reconstructed using e.g. Gabor filters
or the AM-FM model. The interridge distances are checked for devi-
ations from the empirical data obtained from real fingerprints and if
required, the interridge distance image is adjusted and the reconstruc-
tion step is repeated.
• Optionally, noise can be simulated for copies of the constructed im-
age, and if desired, they can be rotated, translated and nonlinearly
distorted.
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5 Identification
Up to this point, we applied minutiae statistics for classifying a fingerprint
as real or synthetic. In this section, we explore the potential of MHs for
identifying individuals.
The approach described previously based on MHs allows to represent a
fingerprint as a fixed-length feature vector. Obtaining a fixed-length feature
vector representation marks the grand goal for biometric template protection
schemes and has previously been achieved by Xu et al. in their spectral
minutiae representation [45]. Robust fixed-length feature vectors also appear
highly promising for an identification scenario in which a large database is
searched for a query fingerprint.
Up to this point, the minutiae distributions represented by MHs were
compared using the earth mover’s distance. For the purpose of identification,
we compute the histogram intersection to better handle partial overlap [46].
This approach is related to “geometric hashing” [47]: a hash table is built
by quantizing geometric objects like minutiae triplets which were used in
[48, 49, 50].
In a first test on FVC2000 DB2, we achieved average access rates (aver-
age part of the database that is accessed using an incremental search strat-
egy until the corresponding finger is found) between 2.33% and 4.01% using
unnormalized 4D-MHs with 20 bins for differences between minutiae direc-
tions, 20 bins for Euclidean distances between minutiae locations, 20 bins
for the angle of the relative location of the second minutiae with respect to
the first and 4 bins for minutiae type combinations. We chose this database,
because it was used in tests measuring the indexing performance by other
researchers: De Boer et al. tested three different features (orientation field,
finger code, minutiae triplets) and their combination on this database and
they reported rates between 1.34% and 7.27% [51]. Cappelli et al. proposed
minutiae cylinder code and locality-sensitive hashing for fingerprint index-
ing [52] and report an average access rate of 1.72% for this database. As
we used, in contrast to these two studies, an “off the shelf” minutiae ex-
tractor (VeriFinger 5.0), and as the performance hinges on correct minutiae
extraction (see Figure 7 and the discussion below) we deem our results very
promising upon more “correct” minutiae extraction.
In our test, we used the sum of intersections between corresponding bins
as a score (BIS = bin intersection score) and sorted the list of fingers in
the database in descending order. In 597 out of 770 searches (77 %), the
correct finger was ranked first in the list. If the search is narrowed down to
templates with 30 or more minutiae, than it ranked first in 393 out of 441
searches (89 %).
We inspected the cases in which a larger portion of the database were ac-
cessed. It turned out that the main reason lies in minutiae extraction errors
(missing and spurious minutiae) which, of course, have a negative impact on
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the score: missing minutiae reduce the intersection between minutiae his-
tograms of templates from the same finger, spurious minutiae can increase
the intersection between histograms from templates of different fingers. A
typical example is shown in Figure 7. Another reason lies in almost no over-
lap areas between the two prints compared. We stress at this point that our
BIS has been designed to alleviate small overlaps.
It is obvious that for a fair comparison between different minutiae-based
indexing methods, the same minutiae templates have to be used. In doing
so, the influence of different minutiae extractors on the identification perfor-
mance can be eliminated and only then results become comparable. It is of
interest to quantify the impact of different minutiae extractors and different
fingerprint image enhancement techniques on the identification performance,
but these comparisons are beyond the scope of this study. This first test
shows the suitability of MHs for identification purposes and this direction
deserves further research.
6 Fingerprint Individuality and Quantifying Weight
of Evidence in Court
Universality, collectability, permanence and uniqueness are properties which
render an anatomical or behavioral trait useful for biometric recognition [2].
Permanence of the fingerprint pattern was scrutinized by Galton [53] more
than a century ago and it was later confirmed that the pattern’s development
is finalized at an estimated gestational age of 24 weeks [14]. Uniqueness
of fingerprints is commonly assumed by all researchers and practitioners
dealing with fingerprint recognition. Fingerprint individuality has never
been proven, but there is a long history of models attempting to explain
and quantify fingerprint individuality starting with Galton in 1892 [53] to
the present day. Stoney gives an overview over 10 major models formulated
between 1892 and 1999 in Chapter 9 of [54]. For recent additions, please
see [55, 56, 8] and the references therein. There are two broad categories of
models: First, mathematical models trying to encompass the distribution of
features extracted from observed prints. And secondly, biology based models
about randomness during the formation of friction ridge skin in prenatal
development of human life [57, 10, 12, 11, 8]. Notwithstanding the lack of
’proof’ of uniqueness, fingerprints have a long success story in commercial,
governmental and forensic applications [58].
As a consequence of an on-going reformation process [59], in the future
forensic experts may have to quantify the weight of evidence with probabil-
ities and errors rates instead of a binary decision [60]. By their very nature,
MHs (2D-, 4D-, second and higher order) as empirical realisations of an
underlying – to date unknown – true minutiae distribution precisely yield
such probabilities. For instance for a given confidence level 0 < α < 1, for
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each true finger t multiply represented in a database, a neighborhood Nα,t
in the space of corresponding (possibly higher order and/or extended) MHs
can be computed, via bootstrapping, say, such that for a query fingerprint
q with MH hq under the null-hypothesis that q is another imprint of t,
Pe{hq ∈ Nα,t} ≥ 1− α
where Pe is the empirical probability.
The use of the corresponding test, of course, relies on prior thorough
statistical studies of these true distributions. Further research, exploiting
the abundance of optional statistical methods, may choose likelihood ratios
[61], say, for improved quantification.
A crucial point is that the underlying minutiae statistics have to be based
on a large number of real fingers. Minutiae should be manually marked or
in semi-automatic fashion, a human should inspect automatically extracted
minutiae in order to avoid minutiae extraction errors and their influence on
the MHs. Ideally, interridge distances or related measures like e.g. ridge
count would be taken into account and additional information would be
available for minutiae templates, including age, body height, sex and ethnic-
ity [62]. This would enable the computation of more sophisticated statistics,
e.g. the probability that a print with certain minutiae histogram stems from
a person of certain age group.
In summary, MHs can become a useful tool for forensic experts who are
requested to quantify the weight of fingerprint evidence in court based on
empirical ground truth data.
7 Conclusion
The proposed MHs capture and comprise relevant information of finger-
prints, namely the full distribution of minutiae, which enable to separate cur-
rent state-of-the-art synthetic fingerprints from prints of real fingers. This
study reveals a fundamental difference between natural finger pattern for-
mation and state-of-the-art synthetic fingerprint generation processes. As a
consequence, any results obtained on existing databases of synthetic finger-
prints should be regarded with caution and may not reflect the performance
of a fingerprint comparison software in a real-life scenario. A performance
evalution of FVC2004 showed that ’the behavior of the algorithms over DB4’
(the database consisting of synthetic prints) ’was, in general, comparable to
that on the real databases’ [63]. However, this can also be interpreted as
an indicator that the participating algorithms are not yet optimized for the
specifics of the empirical distribution of minutiae in real fingerprints.
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7.1 Other Research Directions
Another direction of research beyond the ones discussed in Sections 4 to 6
can go towards the identification of additional features for the discrimination
between real and synthetic prints. In the context of presentation attack
detection, it would be highly desirable to detect a reconstructed fingerprint,
even if this property cannot be infered from the minutiae distribution.
We would also like to explore the suitability of minutiae histograms
for security applications, e.g. in combination with the fuzzy commitment
scheme or the fuzzy vault scheme, and for the generation of cancelable tem-
plates.
In this research, we used a second order minutiae statistic reflecting the
covariance structure of the minutiae distributions which turned out to be
highly discriminatory for our task. Exploring the discriminative potential
of higher order minutiae histograms is beyond the scope of this paper and
remains an interesting endeavor.
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